Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment* |
|||||||
| 文獻名稱 | Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment* | ||||||
| 文獻作者 | Oriana Bandiera Iwan Barankay Imran Rasul | ||||||
| 作者所在單位 | London School of Economics and Political Science,University of Essex,University College London | ||||||
| 文獻分類 | 已發(fā)表文獻 | ||||||
| 學科一級分類 | 經濟 | ||||||
| 學科二級分類 | 行為與實驗經濟學 | ||||||
| 文獻摘要 |
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers. |
||||||
| 參考文獻 | |||||||
| 關鍵字 | Incentives ,Experimen | ||||||
| 發(fā)表所在刊物（或來源） | Quarterly Journal of Economics,May 2007, Vol. 122, No. 2, Pages 729-773 | ||||||
| 發(fā)表時間 | May 2007 | ||||||
| 適用研究領域 | |||||||
| 評論 | |||||||
| 上傳時間 | 2011-1-30 12:04 | ||||||
| 下載文獻 |
managerial_incentives_QJE.pdf[479.98 KB]
注：下載文獻會消耗您一個“當日剩余下載次數” |
||||||
會員評論 |
|||||||
京ICP備16021002-2號 京B2-20170662號
京公網安備 11010802022788號
論壇法律顧問：王進律師
知識產權保護聲明
免責及隱私聲明
