Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection |
|||||||
| 文獻(xiàn)名稱 | Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection | ||||||
| 文獻(xiàn)作者 | Joseph P. Newhouse | ||||||
| 作者所在單位 | 哈佛大學(xué) | ||||||
| 文獻(xiàn)分類 | 已發(fā)表文獻(xiàn) | ||||||
| 學(xué)科一級(jí)分類 | 經(jīng)濟(jì) | ||||||
| 學(xué)科二級(jí)分類 | 衛(wèi)生經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué) | ||||||
| 文獻(xiàn)摘要 |
The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply-price analog to the demand-price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion. Under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon. The presence of contracting costs in a Rothschild-Stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome. |
||||||
| 參考文獻(xiàn) | |||||||
| 關(guān)鍵字 | incentives moral hazard risk aversion | ||||||
| 發(fā)表所在刊物（或來(lái)源） | Journal of Economic Literature，Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 1236-1263 | ||||||
| 發(fā)表時(shí)間 | Sep., 1996 | ||||||
| 適用研究領(lǐng)域 | |||||||
| 評(píng)論 | |||||||
| 上傳時(shí)間 | 2011-2-21 15:26 | ||||||
| 下載文獻(xiàn) |
Newhouse96.pdf[648.05 KB]
注：下載文獻(xiàn)會(huì)消耗您一個(gè)“當(dāng)日剩余下載次數(shù)” |
||||||
會(huì)員評(píng)論 |
|||||||
如有投資本站、合作意向或投放廣告，請(qǐng)聯(lián)系：13661292478（劉老師）
郵箱：service@pinggu.org 投訴或不良信息處理：（010-68466864）
京ICP備16021002-2號(hào) 京B2-20170662號(hào)
京公網(wǎng)安備 11010802022788號(hào)
論壇法律顧問(wèn)：王進(jìn)律師
知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)聲明
免責(zé)及隱私聲明
