Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability

相似文件 換一批

是 否 +2 論壇幣

k人 參與回答

經(jīng)管之家送您一份

應(yīng)屆畢業(yè)生專屬福利!

求職就業(yè)群

趙安豆老師微信：zhaoandou666

經(jīng)管之家聯(lián)合CDA

送您一個(gè)全額獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金名額~ !

立即領(lǐng)取

感謝您參與論壇問題回答

經(jīng)管之家送您兩個(gè)論壇幣！

+2 論壇幣

Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China
abbr_ec51d206b936730876d83c829ac9ae66.pdf (1003.28 KB)

2011-4-19 08:59:43 上傳

Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China
Monica Martinez-Bravoy, Gerard Padro i Miquelz, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao
4/12/2011 (First Version: 9/1/2007)

Abstract

We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China
made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model
to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into
account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing of the
top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal effects of elections and
find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects
of increased local leader accountability.

Keywords: Institutions, Elections, Leader Accountability, Local Democracy, Public Goods.

掃碼加我 拉你入群

請(qǐng)注明：姓名-公司-職位

以便審核進(jìn)群資格，未注明則拒絕

分享0 收藏0 回帖

關(guān)鍵詞：Democracies Elections Election Increase Ability Local Increase Elections