1.劉有貴,蔣年云.委托代理理論述評(píng)[J]學(xué)術(shù)界.2006(01)摘要：委托代理理論的核心是解決在利益相沖突和信息不對(duì)稱情況下,委托人對(duì)代理人的激勵(lì)問題,即代理問題。經(jīng)過30余年的發(fā)展,委托代理理論已由傳統(tǒng)的雙邊委托代理理論發(fā)展出多代理人理論、共同代理理論和多任務(wù)代理理論。這些代理理論都遵循著同一的研究范式、假說前提和基本分析框架。
關(guān)鍵詞：委托代理理論; 假設(shè)前提; 分析邏輯; 基本結(jié)論;
分類號(hào)：D913
2.李富強(qiáng)，李斌.委托代理模型與激勵(lì)機(jī)制分析[J]數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究.2003(09)
摘要：本文在委托代理模型的基本框架下,對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度與最優(yōu)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了分析,利用不確定性等值的概念,具體分析了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度對(duì)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的影響。并且分析了代理人的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度、企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)情況與激勵(lì)系數(shù)的關(guān)系。利用拉豐的顯示原理,分析了代理人能力對(duì)于激勵(lì)機(jī)制效應(yīng)的影響。得到了與線性契約假設(shè)下相同的結(jié)論。究其根源,兩者都是建立在參與約束和激勵(lì)相容約束基礎(chǔ)之上的。
關(guān)鍵詞：風(fēng)險(xiǎn); 激勵(lì)機(jī)制; 代理人能力; 最優(yōu)行動(dòng);
分類號(hào)：F224
3.鄭志剛.投資者之間的利益沖突和公司治理機(jī)制的整合[J]經(jīng)濟(jì)研究.2004(02)
摘要：本文在企業(yè)家 (控制性投資者 )道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的框架下 ,探討了內(nèi)部和外部控制系統(tǒng)及其整合對(duì)降低由投資者之間的利益沖突所產(chǎn)生的代理成本的作用。我們證明 ,外部控制系統(tǒng)的存在 ,將使內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)的監(jiān)督功能加強(qiáng) ,從而使公司治理機(jī)制整體形成對(duì)企業(yè)家道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的有效約束。當(dāng)企業(yè)家與分散投資者所簽訂的合約滿足企業(yè)家激勵(lì)相容約束條件時(shí) ,內(nèi)部和外部控制系統(tǒng)表現(xiàn)為互補(bǔ)關(guān)系 ;否則 ,只有外部控制系統(tǒng)發(fā)揮作用 ,而不需要引入內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)。因而二者的關(guān)系不是公司治理現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)所認(rèn)為的簡(jiǎn)單的單調(diào)關(guān)系
關(guān)鍵詞：道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn); 第二類代理成本; 外部控制系統(tǒng); 內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng); 機(jī)制整合;
分類號(hào)：F276.6
4.袁江天，張維.多任務(wù)委托代理模型下國(guó)企經(jīng)理激勵(lì)問題研究[J]管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào).2006(03)
摘要：運(yùn)用多任務(wù)委托代理模型研究國(guó)企經(jīng)理的最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同后得出,若多工作任務(wù)努力的激勵(lì)成本之間相互獨(dú)立,那么激勵(lì)相容條件下的各工作任務(wù)的最優(yōu)業(yè)績(jī)報(bào)酬也是相互獨(dú)立的,且最優(yōu)業(yè)績(jī)報(bào)酬是絕對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度、邊際激勵(lì)成本變化率和可觀測(cè)變量方差的遞減函數(shù);而如果多工作任務(wù)激勵(lì)成本是相互依存的,那么在激勵(lì)相容條件下,政治性活動(dòng)和滿足上級(jí)偏好的最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同為“門檻型激勵(lì)合同”,即只有當(dāng)國(guó)企經(jīng)理所創(chuàng)造的業(yè)績(jī)超過一定的“門檻值”時(shí),對(duì)其的激勵(lì)才是正向的,否則將是負(fù)向的.并且定量地給出了國(guó)企經(jīng)理的“門檻型激勵(lì)條件”.
關(guān)鍵詞：國(guó)有企業(yè); 經(jīng)理人激勵(lì); 多任務(wù)委托代理模型; 門檻型激勵(lì)合同;
分類號(hào)：F272
5.郭其友，李寶良.機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論:資源最優(yōu)配置機(jī)制性質(zhì)的解釋與應(yīng)用——2007年度諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主的主要經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論貢獻(xiàn)述評(píng)[J]外國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理.2007(11)
摘要：瑞典皇家科學(xué)院10月15日宣布,將2007年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)授予美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家里奧尼德.赫維茨(Leonid Hurwicz)、埃里克.S.馬斯金(Eric S.Maskin)和羅杰.B.邁爾森(Roger B.Myerson),以表彰他們?yōu)闄C(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論的奠定及其發(fā)展所做出的卓越貢獻(xiàn)。本文以機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論的核心問題,即如何在信息分散和信息不對(duì)稱的條件下設(shè)計(jì)激勵(lì)相容的機(jī)制來實(shí)現(xiàn)資源的有效配置為線索,簡(jiǎn)要評(píng)述2007年度諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主的理論貢獻(xiàn)以及機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論對(duì)于我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的重要應(yīng)用價(jià)值。
關(guān)鍵詞：機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論; 顯示原理; 實(shí)施理論; 資源配置機(jī)制;
DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2007.11.001
分類號(hào)：F0
6.Ali Ghaffarinejad,Mohammad Kazem Akbari. An incentive compatible and distributed reputation mechanism based on context similarity for service oriented systems[J]. Future Generation Computer Systems,2013,29(3).
ABSTRACT:Abstract(#br)One major challenge in service oriented systems is how to establish a trusted relationship between different parties. A reputation mechanism is the best-known method to build trust and foster mutual cooperation. Reputation mechanisms require correct and honest feedback to function effectively. An incentive compatible reputation mechanism entices self-interested parties to report the truth by explicit rewards which can offset the potential profits that could be gained by lying. The existing incentive compatible mechanisms are centralized which gather feedback merely through a specific service offered by a service provider, while they ignore some useful information on other services that are offered by the same service provider. In this paper, we introduce a novel distributed reputation mechanism based on a number of special reputation centers (SRCs) for service oriented environments. Each SRC gathers reputation information for a predetermined service offered by different service providers. The proposed model is collusion resistant and offers incentives to SRCs for making an attempt at gathering reputation information thoroughly and report it honestly. We then also evaluate the integrity and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism by carrying out experiments under different settings of the electronic marketplace. Examination of the results confirms that the new approach outperforms other incentive compatible reputation solutions reported in the literature. 還原
KEYWORDS:Trust management; Distributed reputation mechanism; Incentive compatible; Service oriented architecture; Context similarity;
JOURNAL:Future Generation Computer Systems
SOURCE:Elsevierjournal
DOI:10.1016/j.future.2012.03.021
YEAR:2013
PAGES:863-875
PUBLISHER:Elsevier B.V.
7.Incentive compatible market design with applications
作者： M. Bumin Yenmez
作者單位： 1Carnegie Mellon University
刊名： International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, Vol.44 (3), pp.543-569
來源數(shù)據(jù)庫： Springer Journal
DOI： 10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8
關(guān)鍵詞： Auctions;Matching;Incomplete information;Incentive compatibility;Multidimensional types;
英文摘要： Abstract(#br)This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, we derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or we show that it does not exist. Each participant’s utility is quasi-linear in money, and depends upon the allocation that he gets and his privately known multidimensional ‘type.’ The key properties are incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties.