An interesting working paper on bank failure

相似文件 換一批

是 否 +2 論壇幣

k人 參與回答

經(jīng)管之家送您一份

應(yīng)屆畢業(yè)生專屬福利!

求職就業(yè)群

趙安豆老師微信：zhaoandou666

經(jīng)管之家聯(lián)合CDA

送您一個全額獎學金名額~ !

立即領(lǐng)取

感謝您參與論壇問題回答

經(jīng)管之家送您兩個論壇幣！

+2 論壇幣

Title: Market Liquidity and Creditor Runs: Feedback, Amplication, and Multiplicity


abstract:
In the global games framework, this paper studies bank runs in a financial system, in which there are many banks and they share a common asset market. Our model 1) endogenizes market liquidity, 2) demonstrates two-way feedback between market liquidity and creditor runs, and 3) shows the possibility of multiple equilibria in the system: even when the precision of creditors’
private signals approaches infinity, multiple equilibria (i.e., a self-fulflling systemic crisis) can still emerge. Our model helps explain amplication and multiplicity in financial crises.

Keywords: Systemic crises, bank runs, strategic complementarities, equilibrium multiplicity


Please discuss: in the fully-revealing setting (\[\sigma_s\to 0\]), why not use \[s_i^h = \theta_i\] to avoid messing up with the indifference condition ?

掃碼加我 拉你入群

請注明：姓名-公司-職位

以便審核進群資格，未注明則拒絕

分享0 收藏3 回帖

關(guān)鍵詞：interesting interest Failure working inter bank run strategic complementarity financial crises

謝謝分享